# Review Log

## T-001 — 2026-09-24T09:04:30Z

Verdict: PASS

Findings: none.

Validation:

- `go fmt ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go vet ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go test ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `docker build --tag webfilebrowser:t001 .`: PASS
- Sample-config container startup: PASS; logged `Media` at `/mnt/media` and started on `:8080`.
- E2E: NOT_CONFIGURED; project documentation declares no E2E command.

Mechanical validation retry 1:

- `go build ./...` in a root-owned `golang:1.24` container: FAIL because Go's
  VCS metadata lookup invokes Git on the bind-mounted repository, which Git
  rejects as an ownership mismatch. The next attempt disables only VCS
  stamping (`-buildvcs=false`); it still compiles every package.
- `go build -buildvcs=false ./...` in `golang:1.24`: PASS.

The implementation matches T-001: it supplies a Go module and HTTP-server
skeleton, validated file/environment root loading, an example Compose setup and
Docker image, and operator documentation for root configuration and restart
requirements.

## T-002 — 2026-09-24T09:37:48Z

Verdict: PASS

Findings: none.

Validation:

- `go fmt ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go vet ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go test ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `docker build --tag webfilebrowser:t002 .`: PASS
- Container startup with a fresh named SQLite volume: PASS; it loaded the
  sample root and began serving on `:8080` as the non-root application user.
- E2E: NOT_CONFIGURED; project documentation declares no E2E command.

The review found that the SQLite migration seeds the temporary administrator
only on initial database creation, credentials use bcrypt, only hashed session
tokens are stored, and every current/future protected path is authenticated
before route handling. The HTTP integration tests cover the forced password
change gate for the root, file, download, stream, and admin paths.

## T-003 — 2026-09-24T09:52:07Z

Verdict: PASS

Findings: none.

Validation:

- `go fmt ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go vet ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go test ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- E2E: NOT_CONFIGURED; project documentation declares no E2E command.

The review confirms that all filesystem paths are resolved before listing and
that both `..` traversal and an outward-pointing symlink receive a 404 from the
authenticated browser route. The server-rendered pages expose configured roots,
nested folders, breadcrumbs, file metadata, and an inline vanilla-JavaScript
theme control backed by browser local storage.

## T-004 — 2026-09-24T09:59:37Z

Verdict: PASS

Findings: none.

Validation:

- `go fmt ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go vet ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go test ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- E2E: NOT_CONFIGURED; project documentation declares no E2E command.

The review confirms that the new download and stream endpoints reuse the
root-confined file opener, serve only regular files, and delegate byte-range
handling to Go's `http.ServeContent`. Tests verify the attachment's unmodified
bytes, content headers, `206 Partial Content`, `Content-Range`, and
`Accept-Ranges` behavior. No media processing code was added.

## T-005 — 2026-09-24T10:11:01Z

Verdict: PASS

Findings: none.

Validation:

- `go fmt ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go vet ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go test ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- E2E: NOT_CONFIGURED; project documentation declares no E2E command.

The review confirms that user-management routes are checked only after the
existing authentication and mandatory-password-change gates. Every `/admin`
route, including the namespace root, returns `403 Forbidden` with no redirect
for an authenticated standard user. The new storage operations use bcrypt,
force a password change after creates and resets, and invalidate sessions on
resets and disables. README documents the administrator workflow and the
standard-user boundary.

## T-006 — 2026-09-24T10:25:20Z

Verdict: PASS

Findings: none.

Validation:

- `go fmt ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go vet ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go test ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `docker compose config`: PASS; confirms loopback-only port publishing,
  read-only configuration and root mounts, persistent SQLite volume, and the
  restart policy.
- `bash scripts/test-production-deployment.sh`: PASS; builds the image,
  verifies non-root runtime/no Go binary, serves `/login`, and redirects an
  unauthenticated root request to login.

The review confirms that the final Alpine stage retains no Go toolchain, the
build context excludes repository-only artifacts, and both documented launch
paths preserve the root-configuration and persistent-data mounts. README now
covers Compose and Docker Run deployment, first-login administration, the
forced-password-change flow, and reverse-proxy TLS and Range requirements.

## T-007 — 2026-09-24T10:47:05Z

Verdict: PASS

Findings: none.

Validation:

- `go fmt ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go vet ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `go test ./...` (in `golang:1.24`): PASS
- `docker compose config`: PASS with the opt-in unset (empty) and explicitly
  set to `true`; the variable reaches the service only when requested.
- `bash scripts/test-production-deployment.sh`: PASS.

The review confirms that `WEB_FILE_BROWSER_INSECURE_COOKIES` is secure by
default and only disables the `Secure` attribute for an explicit `true` value.
The HTTP cookie-jar test proves that a browser can keep the non-secure cookie
over plain HTTP, remains gated at forced password change, and reaches the home
page after changing the temporary password. `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax`, the
session expiry, and the cookie path remain unchanged. README contains explicit
local-only Compose and Docker Run instructions with an unsafe-use warning.